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[BEEEP|PM-25164] Prevent memory dumping on renderer on Linux (#16136)

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* Implement libmemory_security

* Cleanup and add script

* Remove duplicate build for flatpak

* Rename to process isolation

* Move to desktop native

* Undo changes in gitignore

* Remove after-pack changes

* Run cargo fmt

* Sort deps

* Attempt to fix windows build

* Update apps/desktop/desktop_native/process_isolation/Cargo.toml

Co-authored-by: Daniel García <dani-garcia@users.noreply.github.com>

* Revert "Remove after-pack changes"

This reverts commit c441025587.

* Fix lib process isolation not being included in build

* Fix build

* Attempt to fix build

* Attempt to fix build

* Undo

* Fix library not being included

---------

Co-authored-by: Daniel García <dani-garcia@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Bernd Schoolmann
2025-10-13 15:06:41 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 14e7ee4818
commit a7242a1186
10 changed files with 178 additions and 5 deletions
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46
apps/desktop/desktop_native/process_isolation/src/lib.rs Normal file
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#![cfg(target_os = "linux")]
//! This library compiles to a pre-loadable shared object. When preloaded, it
//! immediately isolates the process using the methods available on the platform.
//! On Linux, this is PR_SET_DUMPABLE to prevent debuggers from attaching, the env
//! from being read and the memory from being stolen.
use desktop_core::process_isolation;
use std::{ffi::c_char, sync::LazyLock};
static ORIGINAL_UNSETENV: LazyLock<unsafe extern "C" fn(*const c_char) -> i32> =
LazyLock::new(|| unsafe {
std::mem::transmute(libc::dlsym(libc::RTLD_NEXT, c"unsetenv".as_ptr()))
});
/// Hooks unsetenv to fix a bug in zypak-wrapper.
/// Zypak unsets the env in Flatpak as a side-effect, which means that only the top level
/// processes would be hooked. With this work-around all processes in the tree are hooked
#[unsafe(no_mangle)]
unsafe extern "C" fn unsetenv(name: *const c_char) -> i32 {
unsafe {
let Ok(name_str) = std::ffi::CStr::from_ptr(name).to_str() else {
return ORIGINAL_UNSETENV(name);
};
if name_str == "LD_PRELOAD" {
// This env variable is provided by the flatpak configuration
let ld_preload = std::env::var("PROCESS_ISOLATION_LD_PRELOAD").unwrap_or_default();
std::env::set_var("LD_PRELOAD", ld_preload);
return 0;
}
ORIGINAL_UNSETENV(name)
}
}
// Hooks the shared object being loaded into the process
#[ctor::ctor]
fn preload_init() {
let pid = unsafe { libc::getpid() };
unsafe {
println!("[Process Isolation] Enabling memory security for process {pid}");
process_isolation::isolate_process();
process_isolation::disable_coredumps();
}
}