diff --git a/apps/desktop/desktop_native/core/src/biometric_v2/linux.rs b/apps/desktop/desktop_native/core/src/biometric_v2/linux.rs
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..44cba4a9e5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apps/desktop/desktop_native/core/src/biometric_v2/linux.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+//! This file implements Polkit based system unlock.
+//!
+//! # Security
+//! This section describes the assumed security model and security guarantees achieved. In the required security
+//! guarantee is that a locked vault - a running app - cannot be unlocked when the device (user-space)
+//! is compromised in this state.
+//!
+//! When first unlocking the app, the app sends the user-key to this module, which holds it in secure memory,
+//! protected by memfd_secret. This makes it inaccessible to other processes, even if they compromise root, a kernel compromise
+//! has circumventable best-effort protections. While the app is running this key is held in memory, even if locked.
+//! When unlocking, the app will prompt the user via `polkit` to get a yes/no decision on whether to release the key to the app.
+
+use anyhow::{anyhow, Result};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use tokio::sync::Mutex;
+use tracing::{debug, warn};
+use zbus::Connection;
+use zbus_polkit::policykit1::{AuthorityProxy, CheckAuthorizationFlags, Subject};
+
+use crate::secure_memory::*;
+
+pub struct BiometricLockSystem {
+    // The userkeys that are held in memory MUST be protected from memory dumping attacks, to ensure
+    // locked vaults cannot be unlocked
+    secure_memory: Arc<Mutex<crate::secure_memory::encrypted_memory_store::EncryptedMemoryStore>>,
+}
+
+impl BiometricLockSystem {
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            secure_memory: Arc::new(Mutex::new(
+                crate::secure_memory::encrypted_memory_store::EncryptedMemoryStore::new(),
+            )),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl Default for BiometricLockSystem {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self::new()
+    }
+}
+
+impl super::BiometricTrait for BiometricLockSystem {
+    async fn authenticate(&self, _hwnd: Vec<u8>, _message: String) -> Result<bool> {
+        polkit_authenticate_bitwarden_policy().await
+    }
+
+    async fn authenticate_available(&self) -> Result<bool> {
+        polkit_is_bitwarden_policy_available().await
+    }
+
+    async fn enroll_persistent(&self, _user_id: &str, _key: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
+        // Not implemented
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    async fn provide_key(&self, user_id: &str, key: &[u8]) {
+        self.secure_memory
+            .lock()
+            .await
+            .put(user_id.to_string(), key);
+    }
+
+    async fn unlock(&self, user_id: &str, _hwnd: Vec<u8>) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        if !polkit_authenticate_bitwarden_policy().await? {
+            return Err(anyhow!("Authentication failed"));
+        }
+
+        self.secure_memory
+            .lock()
+            .await
+            .get(user_id)
+            .ok_or(anyhow!("No key found"))
+    }
+
+    async fn unlock_available(&self, user_id: &str) -> Result<bool> {
+        Ok(self.secure_memory.lock().await.has(user_id))
+    }
+
+    async fn has_persistent(&self, _user_id: &str) -> Result<bool> {
+        Ok(false)
+    }
+
+    async fn unenroll(&self, user_id: &str) -> Result<(), anyhow::Error> {
+        self.secure_memory.lock().await.remove(user_id);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+/// Perform a polkit authorization against the bitwarden unlock policy. Note: This relies on no custom
+/// rules in the system skipping the authorization check, in which case this counts as UV / authentication.
+async fn polkit_authenticate_bitwarden_policy() -> Result<bool> {
+    debug!("[Polkit] Authenticating / performing UV");
+
+    let connection = Connection::system().await?;
+    let proxy = AuthorityProxy::new(&connection).await?;
+    let subject = Subject::new_for_owner(std::process::id(), None, None)?;
+    let details = std::collections::HashMap::new();
+    let authorization_result = proxy
+        .check_authorization(
+            &subject,
+            "com.bitwarden.Bitwarden.unlock",
+            &details,
+            CheckAuthorizationFlags::AllowUserInteraction.into(),
+            "",
+        )
+        .await;
+
+    match authorization_result {
+        Ok(result) => Ok(result.is_authorized),
+        Err(e) => {
+            warn!("[Polkit] Error performing authentication: {:?}", e);
+            Ok(false)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+async fn polkit_is_bitwarden_policy_available() -> Result<bool> {
+    let connection = Connection::system().await?;
+    let proxy = AuthorityProxy::new(&connection).await?;
+    let actions = proxy.enumerate_actions("en").await?;
+    for action in actions {
+        if action.action_id == "com.bitwarden.Bitwarden.unlock" {
+            return Ok(true);
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(false)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    #[ignore]
+    async fn test_polkit_authenticate() {
+        let result = polkit_authenticate_bitwarden_policy().await;
+        assert!(result.is_ok());
+    }
+}
diff --git a/apps/desktop/desktop_native/core/src/biometric_v2/mod.rs b/apps/desktop/desktop_native/core/src/biometric_v2/mod.rs
index e37a101e2ae..669267b7829 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/desktop_native/core/src/biometric_v2/mod.rs
+++ b/apps/desktop/desktop_native/core/src/biometric_v2/mod.rs
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 use anyhow::Result;
 
 #[allow(clippy::module_inception)]
-#[cfg_attr(target_os = "linux", path = "unimplemented.rs")]
+#[cfg_attr(target_os = "linux", path = "linux.rs")]
 #[cfg_attr(target_os = "macos", path = "unimplemented.rs")]
 #[cfg_attr(target_os = "windows", path = "windows.rs")]
 mod biometric_v2;
diff --git a/apps/desktop/desktop_native/core/src/secure_memory/mod.rs b/apps/desktop/desktop_native/core/src/secure_memory/mod.rs
index 8695904758e..d4323ce40dd 100644
--- a/apps/desktop/desktop_native/core/src/secure_memory/mod.rs
+++ b/apps/desktop/desktop_native/core/src/secure_memory/mod.rs
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
 pub(crate) mod dpapi;
 
-mod encrypted_memory_store;
+pub(crate) mod encrypted_memory_store;
 mod secure_key;
 
 /// The secure memory store provides an ephemeral key-value store for sensitive data.